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Another reform of the CAP is under way. At time of writing (2018), the European Commission has tabled new proposals, and several key actorsnotably Member State governments, farm organisations, and major NGOs -have reacted to these proposals. The debate is already hot, as several governments and major farm organisations have stated that the Commission proposals are 'unacceptable'. Such theatrics are not new and public opinion in Europe does not seem to be very concerned. Other issues on the horizon (migrations, domestic and international security issues, the future of a rule-based international trading system, weak real commitments to deal with the threats of climate change, etc.) are seen as much more worrisome. Yet, the CAP, the most important common policy of the European Union in monetary terms at least, is viewed by many as totally obsolete and in need of radical reform.
Many farmers and farm organisations in Europe express great dissatisfaction with the proposed CAP, even though farmers are the main beneficiaries of a policy which consumes some 40 per cent of the entire common budget of the Union and provides farmers with more than 50 per cent of their income. Indeed the income of many European farmers appears low, which raises a question of effectiveness since one of the major objectives of the CAP has always been to support farmers' incomes. In addition, European agricultural support payments are very unevenly distributed, which raises a major issue of equity. The CAP is also sharply criticised on other grounds. Many organisations, notably environment NGOs, lament that the CAP does not properly address important societal concerns in such domains as the environment, food safety, animal welfare, etc. Indeed, they argue that the CAP often makes matters worse on these issues. Admittedly, the above one paragraph assessment of the CAP does not do justice to its complexity. Many of those involved, particularly Commission officials who have spent their entire career defending the CAP and elaborating reform proposals to improve it over the years, feel irritated by these sweeping statements. Yet, it remains that these shortcomings and criticisms of the CAP are widely expressed. The critics suggest that a radical reform is in order. This article explains why such an outcome is very unlikely. A rich literature on the political economy of the CAP since its inception more than 50 years ago (see Box 1), provides us with useful insights to understand this paradox of an ineffective and inequitable policy which cannot be radically reformed even though 'CAP reforms' have regularly been on the policy agenda for almost 30 years. 
EU and US Agricultural Policies
Why is the CAP the way it is? In 2003, I suggested that the following four major long-term economic and institutional forces could account for the trajectory of the CAP during the first three decades of its existence (the 1960s, 70s and 80s):
• the downward rigidity of the nominal value of agricultural price support levels;
• the growth in budget costs;
• external pressures; and
• the need for closure of the debate (Jongeneel and Silvis, 2007; Petit, 2003) . 
External pressures exerted through the General Agreement on Trade
and Tariffs (GATT) negotiations became irresistible in the early 1990s. Budget costs were not under control, and as a result the rigidity of EU price support levels had to 'give'. This was the main substance of the MacSharry reform of 1992, i.e. lower price support levels and the introduction of 'compensatory payments' to farmers. This reform can thus be interpreted as the result of a radical shift in the relative influences of long-term economic forces. However, these outside pressures were not new; they had been exerted, particularly by the US government, in successive GATT negotiations for decades. For instance they led to the 'chicken war' in the 1960s and to the paralysis of the Tokyo round of the GATT for several years in the 1970s. In the Uruguay Round of the GATT, which started in 1986, the US government continued to put pressure on the CAP, with the support of the Cairns group that was created a few years before at the initiative of the Australian government. Quickly, it became obvious that no deal excluding agriculture from the liberalisation process could be found; while at the same time many economic stakeholders in Box 1: Political economy literature and the CAP For a long time, European agricultural economists thought that their main role with respect to the CAP was that of policy advisers. In the 1980s, the attention began to shift from a normative posture (what should the policy be?) to a more analytical one (why is the policy what it is?). Borrowing from what had become the 'new political economy' literature, approaches were developed to understand the determinants of agricultural policies. Some 40 years later, the international literature on the political economy of agricultural policies is very rich (Swinnen, 2018) . However, most of the empirical work by economists, trying to quantify the relative weights of the policy determinants, has been done in a static, or at best comparative static, framework. Some 30 years ago, I proposed an alternative analytical framework stressing the path dependency character of the policy decision process (Petit, 1985) . This framework has been used more or less directly by several authors (Moyer and Josling; Petit et al.; Kay, Cunha and Swinbank, etc.) to assess the evolution of agricultural policies in Europe and the USA from the 1930s to the beginning of the 2000s. In a nutshell, policy decisions are seen in the short run as the outcome of a process of political interaction among many actors pursuing their individual objectives, be it the promotion of their economic interests or some political objective. But, in the long run, economic and institutional forces become critical because these forces determine the interests at play in the short run. This article deals with the evolution of the CAP over several decades, focusing on the main long-term economic and institutional forces.
Europe wanted a deal and were not willing to accept being taken hostage by agriculture. More specifically for agriculture, the Commission stated that the reduction of the agricultural budget it proposed for the next financial period would be 5 per cent. This figure grossly underestimated the real reduction proposed, in particular because it was expressed in nominal and not real terms. This led to a quite acrimonious dispute
Farmers' incomes will be greatly affected by cuts in European payments.
reflecting also the complexity involved in such computations; see Matthews (2018) for a thorough discussion of this complexity.
2. The concern for farmers' income is also very high on the agenda of the current policy debate. This is quite understandable since direct payments contribute more than 50 per cent of farmers' income and, as just discussed, the budget constraint is such that these payments will be sharply reduced. Admittedly, the payments are very unevenly distributed, but the main point here is that the income of many European farmers will be seriously affected, a situation which is a source of a massive political pressure. Accordingly, this concern has been the main driver of the hard criticisms against the Commission proposal voiced by a large number of Finally, nothing has been said so far of the so-called 'new delivery mechanism' proposed by the Commission. Could this new institutional mechanism be the radical reform of the CAP? Sensitive to the sharp criticisms of the complexity of the CAP and the heavy administrative costs involved, the Commission has proposed to simplify and to decentralise decisions to Member States. This has led to sharp reactions against what many saw as a 'renationalisation' of the CAP. The main concern, I believe, is the fear that European payments being less predictable and secure, farmers' incomes would be further damaged; another manifestation of the importance of the concern for farm income as a force determining the policy process. Whether or not the new delivery mechanism will entail simplification of the implementation is questionable. Member State governments are expected to develop 'a national CAP Strategic Plan' to be assessed by the Commission, which will 'approve the plans and monitor progress'. This will certainly entail a lot of bureaucracy in Member States and in Brussels. Assuredly, transaction costs will increase and many national administrations will face a heavy challenge. Only the future will tell how the new measures will be implemented but at this stage the new mechanism does not seem to radically change the play of the long-term forces discussed in this paper.
Radical reform unlikely
This brief analysis of the four long-term economic and institutional forces determining the interests at play in the current CAP reform debate is admittedly extremely simplified. Yet, it has the advantage of focusing on what I believe are the main determinants of the debate and of pointing out the very limited margins for manoeuvre by the various actors involved. The policy situation today is the outcome of a long sequence of events and decisions throughout the past decades. In a sense, starting from scratch is not an option. As a result, the Commission cannot propose a radical reform and no other actor is in a position to do so. Consequently, in spite of its many shortcomings and of the sharp criticisms it faces, the CAP will probably not be profoundly changed. This is despite the new delivery mechanism put in place, provoking important changes in the respective roles of the actors implementing the CAP, but not changing significantly the play of the major forces discussed here.
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